ADR-0008: Upload hardening — strip-by-re-encode and SSRF via dialer Control¶
- Status: Accepted
- Date: 2026-06-19
- Deciders: @lusoris
- Tags: storage, security, ssrf, uploads
Context¶
User uploads carry two latent attack surfaces. (1) Image files embed metadata
(EXIF GPS coordinates, camera serials, XMP, PNG text chunks) that leaks PII when
served back — a GDPR / BSI C5 concern per principles.md §2.5.
(2) Any "fetch this image by URL" feature is a Server-Side Request Forgery
vector: an attacker supplies http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata) or an
internal 10.x address and the server fetches it. SEI CERT and OWASP ASVS L2
require both surfaces be closed at the framework boundary, not per-app.
Two architecture choices are contestable and have security implications, so they warrant a record: how to strip metadata, and how to enforce SSRF protection without breaking the framework's existing instrumented HTTP client.
Decision¶
We will strip image metadata by decode → optional orientation-bake →
re-encode through the Go stdlib (image/jpeg, image/png, image/gif), which
emits no ancillary metadata, rather than parsing and rewriting EXIF blocks. We
will enforce SSRF protection via code.dny.dev/ssrf's net.Dialer.Control
hook, which composes under the framework's OTel-instrumented http.Transport
and validates the resolved IP at dial time (re-run per redirect hop), rather than
a whole-client wrapper. Object-key traversal validation stays pure stdlib
(path.Clean + filepath.IsLocal + explicit cross-OS reserved-name rejection).
Alternatives considered¶
| Option | Pros | Cons | Why not chosen |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strip via stdlib re-encode (chosen) | Zero dep; drops all metadata categories by construction; pure Go | Lossy for JPEG; raster-only (no WEBP/AVIF without CGO) | Best safety/maintenance trade-off; the lossy re-encode is acceptable and documented. |
Parse-and-rewrite EXIF (dsoprea/go-exif) |
Lossless container edit | Heavy transitive tree; parses but does not strip the container; only addresses EXIF, not XMP/PNG-text | Wrong tool: we need stripping, not parsing. |
go-oss / rwcarlsen/goexif |
Purpose-built | Stale (2018, JPEG-only) / open OSV advisory GO-2025-3598 | Unacceptable in an 85%-coverage security package. |
SSRF via ssrf dialer Control (chosen) |
Composes under our transport; IANA-registry-generated deny set; dial-time + per-hop validation | 2023 v0.2.0 tag (low maintenance velocity) | Correct shape and most complete coverage; surface is tiny and regenerable, so a fork is cheap. |
doyensec/safeurl |
Newer, maintained | Whole-client wrapper that panics if the transport defines a custom Dial — collides with our OTel client | Wrong shape for a framework that ships its own HTTP client. |
mccutchen/safedialer |
Same Control shape, pure Go | Deny ranges hand-maintained in source, not IANA-generated | More drift risk for a security gate. |
Hand-rolled net.IP.IsPrivate |
No dep | Explicitly not a security primitive (golang/go#79925): misses link-local, CGNAT, IPv4-mapped v6, NAT64, 0.0.0.0; runs post-DNS (rebinding-vulnerable) | Re-implements a registry ssrf already maintains, badly. |
Consequences¶
- Positive: One sanctioned, instrumented fetch path with correct IANA-backed deny coverage and per-hop revalidation (defeats DNS rebinding and redirect-to-internal). Metadata stripping needs no third-party dep and removes every metadata class, not just EXIF. Key validation is cross-OS safe.
- Negative: JPEG re-encode is lossy (quality/size change);
auto_orientbakes rotation but the orientation read is a small bespoke EXIF parser we now own. Raster scope only: WEBP/AVIF/TIFF require govips (CGO, separate go.mod); SVG/PDF/Office are rejected by content-type, never "stripped". - Follow-ups: Pin
code.dny.dev/ssrfand add it to Renovate; if the prefix table drifts, regenerate viassrfgenor fork. All upload-by-URL code MUST route throughsafety.Fetcher; any defaulthttp.Clientbypasses the guard. A future IANA-prefix-refresh ticker wires viafx.Lifecycle, neverinit().
References¶
- [RFC — IANA IPv4/IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registries] — source of the deny set.
code.dny.dev/ssrf(github.com/daenney/ssrf), MIT, v0.2.0 — dialer Control hook.- golang/go#79925 —
net.IP.IsPrivateis not a security primitive. - OSV GO-2025-3598 — advisory on
rwcarlsen/goexif. - principles.md §2.5 / §2.6 — security + wire-protocol standards.
storage/safety/AGENTS.md— implementation + config keys.